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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
v. : 
PHILIP EARL HOLLEN 
CaseNo.20000585-SC 
Defendant/Petitioner : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal challenges a judgment of conviction for two counts of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-302 
(1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(3)(i) 
(1996) which grants it jurisdiction over appeals from a final judgment for a first degree 
felony conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The rules of evidence allow experts to testify about the facts supporting the 
ultimate issue in a case. The trial judge barred an expert from testifying about whether 
the circumstances surrounding the eyewitness identifications undermined the reliability of 
the identifications. Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in excluding this testimony? 
Trial judges have wide discretion to admit expert testimony. State v. Larsen, 865 
P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). Defense counsel challenged the trial judge's refusal to 
admit the expert's opinion at trial and in a motion for new trial. R. 317: 216-17; 265-66.l 
2. The Due Process Clause of the Utah Constitution bars the admission of 
unreliable eyewitness identifications. In this case, the eyewitnesses could not see the 
assailant's face because he wore a baseball cap, wraparound sunglasses, and a false 
mustache; the witnesses were distracted and fearful; and suggestion permeated each phase 
of the proceedings. Did the trial judge err in refusing to suppress the identifications? 
In reviewing the admission of eyewitness identifications, this Court reverses the 
trial court's findings of facts if they are against the clear weight of the evidence and 
reviews its reliability determination for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 
(Utah 1991). Trial counsel preserved this issue in a motion to suppress, at a hearing on 
the motion, and at trial. R. 84; 315; 316: 64. 
COURT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides for the admission of expert testimony: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Volume 315 contains the suppression hearing transcript. Volumes 316 and 317 
contain the trial transcript. The internal page numbers of those volumes are included after 
"R." and the volume number. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 704(a) allows witnesses to address the ultimate issue of a 
case: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (b), testimony in the form 
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact. 
Article One, section seven of the Utah Constitution protects individuals' right to 
due process of law: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 3, 1995, the State filed an Information charging Appellant Philip Earl 
Hollen with two counts of aggravated robbery. R. 6. On December 23, 1997, defense 
counsel filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications. R. 84. The trial court 
denied the motion following a hearing. R. 269; 315: 102-07. 
The trial court conducted a jury trial on February 24 and 25, 1998. R. 316-17. 
The jury convicted Mr. Hollen of both robbery charges. R. 228-29. The trial judge 
sentenced Mr. Hollen immediately following the jury's verdict. R. 317: 276. The trial 
judge imposed terms of five years to life on both counts and enhanced each sentence up to 
five years for the use of a firearm. R. 259-64; 317: 277-78; Addendum. The trial judge 
ordered the terms to run consecutively to each other and to any other sentence Mr. Hollen 
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was serving. R. 261-64. 
On March 3, 1998, Mr. Hollen filed a motion for new trial. R. 265. On April 21, 
2000, the trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion. R. 318.2 The trial judge denied 
Mr. Hollen relief and entered a written order on May 26, 2000. R. 297; 318: 4-5. Mr. 
Hollen filed a timely notice of appeal on June 23, 2000. R. 298. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Before business hours on the morning of July 16, 1995, Oscar Contreras arrived 
for work at Raging Waters, a water amusement park in Salt Lake City. R. 315: 42. Oscar 
had been training to be a lifeguard and was beginning his employment at the park. R. 
315: 42. As Oscar exited his car, two armed men dressed as lifeguards confronted him. 
R. 315: 42. One man was heavy set with dark hair and he wore red swimming trunks, a 
shirt, and sandals and he held a duffel bag and a gun. R. 315: 42-43. He was disguised 
with a baseball hat, a fake mustache, and wraparound sunglasses that covered his eyes 
and the sides of his face. R. 315: 25-26, 52. He also had long hair that was stuffed inside 
the baseball hat but hung half an inch or so below the bottom of the hat. R. 315: 36-37. 
The second man was tall, slim and blond, and he also wore red swimming trunks, a shirt, 
and sandals, and he held a gun. R. 315: 25. 
2Volume 318 contains the transcript of the hearing on the motion for new trial. 
The internal page numbers of that volume are included after "R. 318" 
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The disguised man informed Oscar that he was robbing the park, warned him not 
to do anything stupid, and asked where the park kept its money. R. 315: 43. When Oscar 
explained that he did not know, the disguised man asked to see the park manager. R. 315: 
43. The sun was up and the lighting was good. R. 315: 45. Oscar did not look directly at 
the men, but, instead, he looked f,[t]o the side." R. 315: 46. 
Oscar escorted the men from the parking lot to the park's administrative offices. 
R. 315: 43. The men pointed their guns at Oscar as they walked side by side. R. 315: 43, 
46. Throughout the incident, Oscar was extremely anxious and fearful and he kept 
thinking of his life, the others' safety, and his daughter. R. 315: 47, 53. 
As the three men approached the offices, the general manager, Lou Livolsi, and the 
operations manager, Channing Jones, were walking out of the water park toward the 
offices. R. 315: 43-44. The two groups met about 10 feet outside the park offices. R. 
315: 59. Mr. Livolsi asked what the men wanted and one of them asked for money. R. 
315: 26. Channing thought the men were joking until Lou asked why he should give 
them money and then the men flashed their guns. R. 315: 26-27. Lou explained that he 
did not have the keys to the vault room but that he would get them. R. 315: 75. 
About this time, another park employee walked by named David Peterson. R. 315: 
75. Lou asked David to go into the offices and get the key from the finance officer, Jill 
Pittman. R. 315:75-76. The group waited 20 to 30 seconds for Jill. R. 315:76. 
When Jill and David emerged from the offices, Jill asked Lou why he needed the 
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key. R. 315: 76. Lou tried to explain that they were being robbed but Jill did not pick up 
on his clues. R. 315: 60, 76-77. Instead, she apparently assumed that the men needed to 
look at the sprinklers system because that was the only reason unauthorized persons were 
allowed in the vault room. R. 315: 61. 
The entire group walked 15 to 20 yards to the vault room. R. 215: 28. Channing 
and Lou initially walked even with the assailants but the robbers instructed them to walk 
in front and told them not to look at the robbers. R. 315: 28. Oscar walked to the side of 
the assailants. R. 315: 46. Jill and David walked behind the others and could not see the 
assailants' faces. R. 315: 60. 
Jill observed that the disguised man's hat had a gap in the back through which she 
could see his hair. R. 315: 67-68. She thought the man had a ponytail because she saw a 
rubber band in his hair but she could not determine his hair length. R. 315: 68. Not 
understanding the situation, she and David joked about the disguised man's appearance as 
the group walked. R. 315: 60. 
Jill opened the first set of doors to the vault room and let everyone inside. R. 315: 
61. Lou then instructed her to open the second set of doors where Janae Jones was 
counting the money from the previous days' take. R. 315: 61-62. Because several 
members of the group were not authorized to enter the second set of doors, Jill looked 
inquisitively at Lou but he assured her to proceed. R. 315: 61-62. Jill knocked on the 
doors and Janae let the group inside. R. 315: 62. 
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Once inside the vault room, the disguised man ordered the other victims to turn 
around and face the wall so they could not see the robbers and instructed Jill to empty the 
contents of the vault into the duffel bag. R. 315: 29, 62, 77. Jill again looked at Lou 
confusingly but he confirmed that she should proceed and offered to help her. R. 315: 62. 
One of the assailants then explained that the demands were part of a drill. R. 315: 62. 
While Jill and Lou filled two bags with money, the tall, blond assailant tied up the 
other victims with plastic handcuffs and taped their mouths with duct tape. R. 315: 62. 
Lou and Jill glanced at the assailants as they emptied the bags but the disguised man 
ordered them not to look at the assailants. R. 315: 78. After the bags were filled, the tall, 
blond man tied up Jill and taped her mouth. R. 315: 64. 
The disguised man asked for Lou's car keys but Lou stated that he didn't have his 
keys with him. R. 315: 78. The disguised man removed Oscar's keys from his pocket, 
gave them to the tall, blond man, and ordered him to retrieve Oscar's car. R. 315: 78-79; 
316: 52, 114. The disguised man then tied up and taped Lou. R. 315: 79. 
A few minutes later, the blond man returned with Oscar's car. R. 316: 115. He 
loaded the car while the disguised man instructed the victims not to call the police for ten 
minutes. R. 316: 115. The men then fled in the car. The victims cut the ties and 
immediately called the police. R. 316: 94. The police found Oscar's car a few blocks 
away and recovered a shoe print from the car. R. 316: 186-87. The police not could link 
the shoe print or any other physical evidence to the robbery. R. 316: 186-88. 
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Contrary to the other witnesses, Jill informed the police that the disguised man did 
not wear glasses. R. 315: 70-71. Lou claimed that the disguised man wore a grey, 
hooded sweatshirt with a University of Utah logo on it. R. 315: 74, 83-84. The other 
witnesses remembered the blond assailant wearing the sweatshirt and the disguised man 
wearing a white t-shirt or tank top. R. 315: 25, 40, 42-43, 51, 61, 72. 
Oscar informed the police that he was so "shocked" by the crime that he did not 
think he could identify the robbers. R. 316: 71. Nevertheless, later that day he and 
Charming helped Detective Ray Dalling to make composite sketches of the assailants. R. 
315: 30, 52. Channing showed the composites to the other victims R. 316: 120-21. 
About two months after the robbery, Channing was watching the news on 
television when he saw a report of a robbery at the Million Dollar Saloon in Salt Lake 
City. R. 315: 31-32. Mr. Hollen was one of the suspects arrested for that robbery. The 
news report showed Mr. Hollen, who had been shot, being wheeled on a gurney into an 
ambulance. R. 315: 31. Channing claimed to have recognized Mr. Hollen as the 
heavyset robber who wore the disguise. R. 315: 31. 
The next day at work, Channing informed Lou that he had seen the disguised 
assailant being arrested on television the previous day. R. 315: 32. Channing then 
relayed his discovery to Det. Dalling. R. 315: 31-32. 
That same day, Det. Dalling prepared a photographic array and showed it to 
Channing and Oscar. R. 315: 10, 12. Det. Dalling used a photograph of Mr. Hollen from 
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police files that was several years old. R. 315: 7, 10; Exhibit 1. He then located five mug 
shots that he believed resembled Mr. Hollen's chin and head shape and matched the 
witnesses' description of the disguised man as having chubby cheeks. R. 315: 10, 21. 
Before showing the photo array to Oscar and Charming, Det. Dalling explained 
that the disguised man may or may not be in the array. R. 315: 11, 13. He also stated that 
they need not identify anyone and that the witnesses could either spread the photos out or 
view them individually. R. 315: 11, 13. He noted that people's appearances, including 
hair styles, may change. R. 315: 11, 13. 
Channing viewed the array for one to one-and-a-half minutes before choosing Mr. 
Hollen's picture. R. 315: 12. Oscar took two-and-a-half to three minutes before picking 
Mr. Hollen's photo. R. 315: 13, 23. After the identification, Det. Dalling informed 
Channing and Oscar that the person they had picked was already in custody for another 
matter. R. 315: 12, 17-18,39. 
Three weeks later, Mr. Hollen appeared in an in-person line-up. R. 315: 80. Oscar 
and Jill identified Mr. Hollen as the disguised assailant. R. 315: 48, 65. Three other 
victims could not positively identify Mr. Hollen. Lou did not mark the box on the form 
the police provided him for identifying any of the line-up participants. R. 315: 81-82; 
Exhibit 27A. Instead, he wrote below the box the number corresponding to Mr. Hollen's 
position in the line-up and added that he was "pretty sure, but not definite." R. 315: 81-
82; Exhibit 27A. David Peterson picked both Mr. Hollen and a filler but concluded that 
9 
the filler was "probably" the assailant. R. 317: 196; Exhibit 27A. Janae Jones chose Mr. 
Hollen and a filler but when the police asked her to guess, she picked the filler. R. 316: 
95-96. Due to a miscommunication, Charming did not attend the line-up. R. 83. 
At the line-up, Lou encountered robbery victims from a movie theater and the 
Million Dollar Saloon who had also attended the proceeding. R. 315: 84. Lou overheard 
these witnesses discussing those crimes. R. 315: 84. Jill had also heard that the suspects 
in this case had been arrested for the Million Dollar Saloon robbery. R. 315: 69-70. 
The State charged Mr. Hollen with two counts of aggravated robbery. R. 6. 
Several court proceedings ensued in this case and for the other robberies of which Mr. 
Hollen was accused. During the various proceedings, the witnesses had seen Mr. 
Hollen5s picture, viewed him in court and, heard the witnesses in other cases accuse Mr. 
Hollen of committing other robberies. R. 315: 33, 39, 50-51, 69-70. 
Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness identifications because 
they were the product of suggestion. R. 84. The State opposed the motion but did not 
object to the defense showing the photographic array to an expert. R. 145, 153-54. 
The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion on February 19, 1998, over two-
and-a-half years after the robbery. R. 315. Oscar testified that he had "plenty of 
opportunity" to see the assailants from a short distance. R. 315: 46-47. Nevertheless, he 
could not remember if the disguised man wore a white t-shirt or a tank top but he thought 
he remembered seeing bare shoulders. R. 315: 42-43, 51. He also admitted that he only 
10 
looked at the assailants "off and on." R. 315: 47. Specifically, he noted that he "was 
always looking at [the disguised] man's face, and the gun." R. 315: 51. He estimated that 
he spent a total often minutes actually looking at the assailants. R. 315: 56. 
He stated that the event had "traumatized" him to such a degree that "there are 
times when I remember, [and] there are times when I don't remember." R. 315: 49. 
Because of his fear and the passage of time, Oscar stated it was "impossible" to remember 
many details including which assailant took his car keys. R. 315: 53-54. In fact, at the 
preliminary hearing, he doubted the accuracy of his identification of Mr. Hollen. R. 315: 
54. Nevertheless, he maintained that he was now certain of his identification because his 
memory had improved over time. R. 315: 54. He conceded that before viewing the photo 
array he believed that Detective Dalling had informed him that the robbery suspects' 
pictures were in the array. R. 315: 48, 50. 
Channing testified that when he first saw the disguised man, he noticed the fake 
mustache because it was "quite unusual." R. 315: 25. He remembered the disguised man 
wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt while the taller assailant wore a grey, hooded 
sweatshirt. R. 315: 25, 40. While David Peterson fetched Jill, Channing focused on the 
assailants' faces from five feet away. R. 315: 27-28. According to Channing, he 
remained calm and relaxed throughout the encounter but he admitted focusing on the 
guns. R. 315: 38. He estimated that he saw the disguised man a total of five minutes 
during the encounter. R. 315: 38. Channing stated that the composite of the disguised 
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man was "very close from what the computer could do" except that it did not include 
enough forehead between the sunglasses and the hat. R. 315: 34-35. 
Lou testified that when the assailants showed their guns outside the office, he was 
"shocked11 and confused. R. 315: 75. He testified that he looked to Oscar for an 
explanation but Oscar stood silent and was visibly "scared." R. 315: 75. He also 
contended that the events happened rather "quickly." R. 315: 75. Despite Lou's fear and 
confusion, he asserted that he remained in control of his emotions because he had seen 
many catastrophic events during his career in the water park business. R. 315: 85. 
Lou saw the assailants as they conversed outside the offices, during the 20 to 30 
seconds while they waited for Jill, and again inside the vault room. R. 315: 76-77. 
Although he was busy filling the bags, he looked directly at the disguised man when 
receiving instructions and periodically as he emptied the vault. R. 315: 77-78. Lou 
estimated that the group was in the vault room a total of five minutes. R. 315: 78. 
Lou maintained that he was 80% or 90% certain that the disguised man wore the 
sweatshirt. R. 315: 83. He described the composite as a "pretty fair" representation of 
the disguised assailant. R. 315: 82. Concerning his identification of Mr. Hollen at the 
line-up, Lou admitted that he could only conclude that Mr. Hollen "possibly" was one of 
the assailants because Mr. Hollen was "the closest choice." R. 315: 82. 
Jill testified that when she exited the office, she glanced at the assailants for just a 
few "seconds." R. 315: 60. She couldn't remember if the disguised man wore a tank top 
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over a white t-shirt or just wore a t-shirt. R. 315: 61, 72. She has some trouble 
remembering how events transpired because "it happened rather quickly . . . ." R. 315: 
62-63. Jill asserted that she glanced at the disguised man three time as she filled the bags. 
R. 315: 63-64. She estimated that she saw the disguised man for 30 seconds on each of 
the three times she looked at him. R. 315: 71. She agreed with Charming that the 
composite did not show enough of the disguised man's forehead. R. 315: 67. She added 
that after the line-up she tried to "keep [the robbery] out of her mind." R. 315: 65. 
Defense counsel called Dr. David Dodd to testify. R. 315: 86-87. When defense 
counsel asked the trial judge to accept Dr. Dodd as an expert in field of eyewitness 
identification, the trial judge asked, "That's a field of study?" R. 315: 87. After defense 
counsel assured the trial judge that eyewitness identification was a specialty in the field of 
Psychology, the judge agreed to entertain Dr. Dodd's testimony subject to any objections 
that the prosecutor might raise later. R. 315: 88. In doing so, the trial judge referred to 
the research on eyewitness identification that this Court discussed in State v. Ramirez. 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), but added that "[wjhether or not, however, that legitimizes this 
specific area of inquiry, I'll leave to another day." R. 315: 88-89. 
Dr. Dodd observed several problems in this case that interfered with the ability of 
the witnesses to accurately identify the assailants. Most obviously, heightened arousal or 
fear impairs people's ability to acquire information. R. 315: 90. Of even more concern, 
"any alteration in the face produces marked reduction in later identifiability." R. 315: 91. 
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These alterations include adding glasses or mustaches. R. 315: 91. He explained that the 
three most salient features humans observe are a person's hair, face shape, and age. R. 
315: 92. When those features are changed in some way, the ability to accurately identify a 
person decreases. R. 315:92. 
Dr. Dodd continued that when these kinds of alterations are coupled with limiting 
a person's options in an identification procedure, "the possibility of suggestibility" arises. 
R. 315: 92. In this case, for example, Dr. Dodd conducted a study in which he showed 
the photo array containing Mr. Hollen's picture to test subjects who were given the 
description of the disguised assailant from the police bulletin. R. 315: 92-93. The 
witnesses described the disguised assailant as a white male between the ages of 30 and 
35, heavy build, 57" to 5'8" tall, round face, and dark hair. R. 315: 94-95. The test 
subjects were then told to list their first and second choices. R. 315: 95. The subjects 
picked only three of the six photos, one of which included Mr. Hollen's. R. 315: 92-95. 
Dr. Dodd noted other problems concerning suggestibility. First, live line-ups are 
preferred over photographs. R. 315: 95. Second, if a witness sees a person on television 
who was arrested for a similar crime the witness may believe that the person on television 
committed the crime regardless of the facts. R. 315: 96. Third, studies show that victims' 
desire to apprehend assailants leads them to pick persons out of line-ups even when the 
actual perpetrator does not participate. R. 315: 96. 
Dr. Dodd emphasized that the certainty of an identification has little correlation to 
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its accuracy. R. 315: 97. He also doubted the reliability of an identification of a person 
whom a witness has seen on one occasion and then tries to recall as little as a week later. 
R. 315: 97-98. 
Dr. Dodd's concerns were amplified here because the disguise prevented the 
witnesses from encoding the disguised man's face. R. 315: 98. Dr. Dodd testified that 
"the concealment by disguise is particularly disruptive of the ability to remember the face, 
because we do in terms of actually remembering a face, we operate as a whole pattern 
rather than in individual pieces." R. 315: 98. The fact that some witnesses did not 
identify a person in a line-up indicates that they did not receive enough information to 
remember the face. R. 315: 99. Dr. Dodd concluded that "there are some serious 
questions about the reliability" of the identification in this case. R. 315: 99. On cross-
examination, Dr. Dodd admitted that the fact that four people identified that same person 
increased the reliability of an identification. R. 315: 99. 
The trial judge concluded that the identifications of Mr. Hollen were sufficiently 
reliable to be admitted at trial. R. 315: 106. He concluded that the witnesses "appeared 
to be credible" and that they each had between one to three and up to 10 minutes within 
which to view the disguised man. R. 270; 315: 103. The lighting conditions were good 
and the witnesses saw the assailants from a few feet away. R. 315: 103. According to the 
judge, "the actor's face, was clearly observed by each of the four witnesses." R. 270; 
315: 103. He added that although the assailants brandished a gun, the witnesses 
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concentrated their attention on identifying the assailants after the demand for money was 
made and while they were being tied. R. 270; 315: 103-04. 
The trial judge concluded that the witnesses' fear did not interfere with their 
capacity to observe the assailants. R. 315: 104. The witnesses had no bias, they were not 
fatigued, nor were they under the influence of drugs or alcohol. R. 315: 104. The judge 
also noted the spontaneity and consistency of the identifications. R. 315: 104. 
The trial judge was also impressed with the witnesses' mental capacity and mental 
acuity and he found them to be candid and forthright. R. 271; 315: 105. He found no 
evidence that any of the witnesses based their identifications on others' opinions because 
they were not exposed to others' views until after the line-up. R. 315: 105. He also noted 
that "from an untrained eye perspective" the photo array was not suggestive. R. 315: 106. 
Finally, the trial judge viewed Dr. Dodd's testimony as providing little assistance: 
The testimony of Dr. Dodd was of little or no 
circumstance to me. Simply put, what he said was if you're 
stressed, you may not perceive things as well as you should. 
Which I won't argue with that concept. If a face is covered or 
masked, it may reduce your reliability, nor will I argue with that. 
If you saw a news report, you may have thought that 
that's some form of suggestion. That may well be an arguable 
proposition in the psychology world. But from the testimony of 
this witness, Mr. Jones, in my judgment, this was simply what 
alerted him to the fact that there was someone remarkably 
similar in appearance to Mr. Hollen that was engaged in the 
robbery that he suffered some months before. And one cannot 
fault an alert and mentally acute victim, and citizen from 
reporting on identification [sic] criminals when they see them. 
Indeed he's to be commended for it. 
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And Dr. Dodd also indicated that victims are notorious 
for wanting to help, and that's no surprise to anyone. So 
essentially his testimony was of little or no help. 
R. 315: 106-07. 
A jury trial was held on February 24 and 25, 1998. R. 316; 317. At the beginning 
of the trial, the State objected to the admission of Dr. Dodd's expert testimony. R. 316: 7. 
The trial judge reluctantly ruled that because this case hinged solely on the accuracy of 
the eyewitness identifications, Mr. Dodd could testify. R. 316: 8. In doing so, he noted 
his skepticism about this Court's opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), 
which detailed the extensive research on the limitations of eyewitness identification: 
And I guess to the extent that Dr. Dodd can shed light on 
the issues that I assumed before the Long case were common 
knowledge, but since Long now discovered they were not 
common knowledge to the extent that people, jurors, need to 
know that if a person's face is masked for instance it might 
hinder the identification, I guess he can testify. 
R. 316:8-9. 
The trial judge cautioned, however, that he would "entertain an appropriate motion 
if Dodd seeks to venture beyond what he's already told us in the suppression hearing . . . 
but I would expect he's probably going to say the same thing he said when he was here at 
the suppression hearing." R. 316: 9. Defense counsel informed the trial judge that she 
planned to elicit additional testimony from Dr. Dodd that wasn't pertinent at the 
suppression hearing. R. 316: 9. The trial judge reiterated his ruling to limit Dr. Dodd's 
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testimony to the information detailed at the suppression hearing and to that contained in a 
report that the defense had given to the prosecution: 
Well, to the extent that he's given [the prosecutor]... a 
report, I don' t think that there' s anything revolutionary about the 
report. I think it is probably fair, particularly in light of the fact 
that the defendant doesn't seem to have anybody else to testify 
on his behalf. So I'll allow the doctor to state what he 
previously stated. 
R. 316:9. 
At trial, Oscar and Jill shed light on the circumstances surrounding their 
identifications of Mr. Hollen. Oscar admitted that when he viewed the photo array he 
believed that the disguised man's picture was in the array. R. 316: 68. He also testified 
at the co-defendant's trial that he had picked Mr. Hollen's picture because it "most" 
reflected the disguised man. R. 316: 69-70. But, he was now certain that Mr. Hollen had 
robbed him. R. 316:70. 
Jill revealed that she first realized that the robbery was not a drill after the 
assailants had tied up her co-workers and she saw that Charming had a tear in his eye. R. 
316: 136. When asked if she had assumed at the line-up that the arrested person would be 
participating, she responded, "Oh, yes." R. 316: 151. She also testified that she had 
informed the police that the disguised man was "overweight." R. 316: 146. Jill conceded 
that at the line-up Mr. Hollen was "close" to the most overweight member of the group, 
"if not one of the most." R. 316: 146. She maintained, however, that she identified Mr. 
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Hollen based on his facial features, not his weight. R. 316: 151-53. 
Dr. Dodd noted several factors that limited the witnesses' capacity to accurately 
identify the assailants, including the fact that they had only seen the robbers on one 
occasion. R. 317: 204. He also concluded that the elaborate disguise had an "enormous 
influence" on the witnesses' ability to acquire memory of the disguised man's the face 
because they could not see the entire facial pattern together. R. 317: 205, 217, 228. 
Dr. Dodd continued that whenever a gun is displayed people tend to spend a 
significant amount of time focusing on the weapon. R. 317: 207. Fear also impairs 
witnesses' ability to acquire memory. R. 317: 217-18. Dr. Dodd expressed particular 
concern that Oscar showed a high degree of fear. R. 317: 218. 
Dr. Dodd explained that research has established that to accurately commit a 
person to memory, a witness must spend time actually examining the other person's face 
rather than simply spending time in a person's presence. R. 317: 226-27. Dr. Dodd noted 
further that crime victims overestimate time by a factor of two to ten times. R. 317: 208. 
He added that studies of actual crimes show that victims "have a very difficult time 
remembering and identifying the face of the person that they saw commit the crime." R. 
317: 220. In retaining memory, Dr. Dodd testified that people erase a memory of faces 
"in a matter of days" when they have seen a person only once. R. 317: 209. He added 
that composite sketches skew people's memories. R. 317: 209. 
Dr. Dodd expressed concern that suggestion had infected the witnesses' memory 
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retrieval in this case. Specifically, the fact that only three of the six pictures in the photo 
array matched the description of the disguised man restricted the witnesses' options. R. 
317:212-13. Even a police officer requesting a witness to come to the police station to 
try to identify a suspect will cause persons to pick a picture 75% of the time. R. 317: 
214-15. Moreover, when, as here, a person believes that the perpetrator is in a line-up, 
that person will likely pick a line-up subject. R. 317: 209-10. Informing witnesses that 
they correctly identified a subject taints subsequent identifications. R. 317: 214. Further, 
when witnesses take over one minute to identify a person's picture, they may not 
remember the person but rather are trying to match similar characteristics. R. 317: 215. 
After reciting these problems, defense counsel asked Dr. Dodd whether he had "an 
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case raises serious questions as 
to it's [sic] reliability?" R. 317: 216. The prosecutor immediately objected, arguing that 
"these are matters the jury can decide." R. 317: 216. The trial judge agreed and held that 
"This is within the province of the jury, Counsel." R. 317: 216. Defense counsel tried to 
argue the issue but the trial judge summarily concluded, "I've ruled." When defense 
counsel asked to argue the matter outside the jury's presence, the judge refused, stating, 
"No, Counsel. Let's complete the examination of the witness." R. 317: 216-17. 
On cross-examination, Dr. Dodd noted that individuals vary in their ability to 
remember. R. 317: 223. He agreed that if several persons identify the same suspect, the 
accuracy of the identification would be more reliable. R. 317: 224. Dr. Dodd also 
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conceded that the amount of time a person takes to identify a person from a photo array 
does not itself show lack of memory. R. 317: 224-25. 
The jury convicted Mr. Hollen on both counts of aggravated robbery. R. 317: 274. 
Following the verdicts, Mr. Hollen asked the trial judge to immediately sentence him. R. 
317: 276. The trial judge agreed to do so and sentenced Mr. Hollen to terms of five years 
to life on each count and ordered the terms to run consecutively. R. 317: 277-78. In the 
written judgment, the trial judge enhanced each sentence up to five years for the use of a 
firearm and he ordered the terms in this case to run consecutively to any other sentences 
Mr. Hollen was serving. R. 317: 261, 263. 
On March 3, 1998, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial based on potential 
juror misconduct and the trial judge's refusal to allow Dr. Dodd to testify about the 
reliability of the eyewitnesses' identifications. R. 265-66. The State opposed the motion 
but agreed to an investigation into the potential juror misconduct. R. 289. 
The trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion on April 21, 2000. R. 318. 
Defense counsel conceded that she could not document the juror misconduct but she 
argued for a new trial based on the limiting of Dr. Dodd's testimony. R. 318: 4. The trial 
judge asked defense counsel, "As I recall, we gave the so-called eye witness identification 
instruction, did we not? That two or three page piece of work from Zimmerman? From 
the Supreme Court?" R. 318: 4. When defense counsel confirmed that the jury had 
received an instruction on eyewitness identification, the trial judge ruled that he was "not 
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persuaded we need to have someone come down here and tell us that witnesses don't 
know what they see." R. 318: 4-5. This appeal followed. R. 298. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the trial judge's ruling, Dr. Dodd's opinion on the reliability of the 
witnesses' identifications was admissible evidence. Although the trial judge properly 
admitted Dr. Dodd's testimony to explain to the jury the limits of human memory and 
perception, the Rules of Evidence also allowed Dr. Dodd to address the ultimate issue of 
reliability. Experts are only barred from telling jurors how to decide a case and from 
usurping the judge's duty to instruct the jury on the law. Here, the issue of reliability 
addressed factual conclusions that allowed the jurors to decide the issue for themselves. 
Reliability did not address any legal issues. This Court's precedents as well as federal 
opinions agree that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding Dr. Dodd's opinion. 
The trial judge also abused his discretion because he failed to consider the 
weaknesses in the identifications and because he misunderstood the law on identification 
testimony. Instead, he decided at the beginning of trial, without weighing the facts or the 
relevant law, not to admit Dr. Dodd's opinion testimony based on his contempt for 
identifcation evidence. This Court has plainly instructed trial judges on the limits of 
eyewitness identifications and has wholly endorsed the research in this area. The trial 
judge's failure to appreciate the inherent problems with the identifications and his 
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hostility toward the relevant law constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
Because the reliability of the identifications was the central issue in this appeal, the 
exclusion of Dr. Dodd's opinion harmed the defense. Although Dr. Dodd discussed the 
problems involved in eyewitness identification, the jury received no guidance in weighing 
the relevant factors. Instead, it was left to fend for itself. Because the State presented no 
other evidence to support the convictions, excluding Dr. Dodd's opinion renders a 
different result more likely. 
The witnesses' identifications were also constitutionally unreliable. The use of a 
disguise, the witnesses' focus on the gun, the distraction of two armed robbers, and the 
witnesses' anxiety, limited the witnesses' opportunity and capacity to observe the 
assailants. Further, some witnesses could not identify Mr. Hollen and the witnesses who 
could did not agree on what he wore. Even more troubling, suggestion permeated the 
proceedings. Specifically, Channing saw Mr. Hollen in a suggestive setting on television. 
Then, the police employed a suggestive photo array and told Oscar and Channing that 
they correctly identified the disguised man. Moreover, the other witnesses at the line-up 
admitted that they expected the disguised man to be a participant. Following the line-up, 
the witnesses were exposed to numerous reports that Mr. Hollen had been involved in 
other robberies. Given the absence of evidence connecting Mr. Hollen to the robbery, the 
State cannot show that the admission of the identification testimony was not harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
R E F U S I N G TO A L L O W THE E X P E R T 
IDENTIFICATION WITNESS TO ASSIST THE JURY IN 
DETERMINING THE RELIABILITY OF THE 
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 
In excluding Dr. Dodd's opinion about the reliability of eyewitness identification, 
the trial judge barred Mr. Hollen from addressing the main issue in this case: how the 
witnesses could have misidentified him. The Rules of Evidence allow expert witnesses to 
offer factual conclusions about ultimate issues. The trial judge's misunderstanding of the 
Rules of Evidence and his hostility toward eyewitness identification evidence was an 
abuse of discretion and irreparably harmed the defense. 
A. The Rules of Evidence Allow Experts to Offer 
Opinions on the Reliability of Eyewitness 
Identification 
The trial judge grossly abused his discretion in refusing to allow Dr. Dodd to give 
his expert opinion. This Court reverses decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony 
when those decisions f,exceed[] the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 
1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). Under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, "[i]f scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
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Recognizing that "jurors tend to be unduly receptive to, rather than skeptical of, 
eyewitness testimony," United States v. Smithers. 212 F.3d 306, 315-16 (6th Cir. 2000), 
numerous courts have determined that expert testimony on the reliability of such evidence 
"can provide significant assistance to the jury beyond that obtained through cross-
examination and common sense." State v. Taylor, 749 P.2d 181, 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1988) (citing inter alia United States v. Moore. 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Downing. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith. 736 F.2d 1103 
(6th Cir. 1984); State v. Chappie. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); People v. Brown. 726 P.2d 
516 (Cal. 1985) frev'd on other grounds. 479 U.S. 538 (1987)); People v. McDonald. 690 
P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984) (overruled in part on other grounds. 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000)); People 
v. Brooks. 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1985); State v. Buell. 489 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1986)). 
Expert testimony is particularly helpful regarding eyewitness identifications because 
"there is no question that many aspects of perception and memory are not within the 
common experience of most jurors, and in fact, many factors that affect memory are 
counter-intuitive." Smithers. 212 F.3d at 316. This Court has repeatedly recognized 
jurors5 unfamiliarity with the weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony. State v. 
Maestas. 1999 UT 32, Tffl 26-27, 984 P.2d 376; State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778-80 
(Utah 1991); State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 488-90 (Utah 1986). 
Although the trial judge properly admitted Dr. Dodd's to testimony, he misapplied 
the law in regarding Dr. Dodd's ultimate opinion on reliability as "within the province of 
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the jury." R. 317: 216. Utah Rule of Evidence 704 plainly provides that "testimony in 
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." (Emphasis added). Thus, 
even though ultimately the jury was charged with determining the reliability of the 
identifications, Dr. Dodd could properly address that issue. The trial judge could have 
only excluded Dr. Dodd's opinion if it was not "otherwise admissible." 
Expert testimony is inadmissible only if expresses a "legal conclusion," Larsen, 
865 P.2d at 1362, or if it merely informs the jury "'what result to reach.5" Davidson v. 
Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.. 
698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). Because the Utah Rules of Evidence generally seek to 
follow the federal rules, "this Court looks to the interpretations of the federal rules by 
federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah rules." State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1317 
(Utah 1986). Under federal law, legal conclusions f"invade[] the province of the court to 
determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury as to that law.'" Torres v. County of 
Oakland. 758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting F.A.A. v. Landv. 705 F.2d 624, 632 
(2d Cir.), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983)). On the other hand, informing the jury what 
result to reach "attempts to substitute the expert's judgment for the jury's." United States 
v. Duncan. 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994). 
In ruling that reliability was "within the province of the jury," the trial judge 
appears to have concluded that defense counsel sought to substitute the jury's judgment 
26 
for Dr. Dodd's. The trial judge's concerns were unfounded. Experts may posit "factual 
conclusions" even if they embrace an issue of fact that is within the jury's province as 
long as the expert does not state legal conclusions based on those facts. Duncan, 42 F.3d 
at 103. "In other words, an expert may offer his opinion as to facts that, if found, would 
support a conclusion that the legal standard at issue was [or was not] satisfied . . . ." 
Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
Here, defense counsel did not ask Dr. Dodd to determine whether the 
identifications were legally reliably. Rather, she properly asked him to provide "the 
groundwork in the form of an opinion to enable the jury to make its own informed 
determination." Duncan, 42 F.3d at 101. Specifically, defense counsel asked Dr. Dodd 
for "an opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case raises serious 
questions as to it's [sic] reliability?" R. 317: 216. Defense counsel left the ultimate 
factual determination for the jury's consideration. 
This Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 
1993). In that case, the State charged the defendant with several counts of securities 
fraud. Id. at 1357. A securities expert testified that the defendant had omitted 
"material[]" information from securities documents. Id. at 1360. The applicable criminal 
statute required persons to disclose all "material" information when offering securities. 
Id. at 1360-61. This Court ruled that the expert could properly testify about the 
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materiality of the omitted information because the significance of that information was "a 
factual issue to be determined by the jury." IdL at 1363. Thus, Rule of Evidence 704 
permitted the expert "to express an opinion regarding the ultimate resolution of that 
disputed issue." kL 
This Court has recently made a similar distinction when it ruled that a mental 
health expert could testify that a rape victim lacked the cognitive capacity to fabricate. 
State v. Adams, 2000 UT 42, Tflj 13-14, 5 P.3d 642. Just as in this case, this Court ruled 
that because the expert did not directly tell the jury whether the victim was or was not 
truthful, his testimony "did not impermissibly invade the province of the jury." Id. at ^ 
14; see also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332 (Utah 1991) (allowing expert in arson 
prosecution to testify that fire had been intentionally set). 
The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 704 endorses this 
approach. The Advisory Committee explained that under that rule counsel may not ask 
an expert whether a person had the capacity to make a will. Duncan, 42 F.3d at 103. 
Counsel may, however, ask if a person had sufficient mental capacity to know the nature 
and extent of his or her property and the natural objects of his or her bounty sufficient to 
formulate a rational scheme of distribution. Id. Defense counsel's question to Dr. Dodd 
about his concerns for reliability no more usurped the jury's role than did the question on 
testamentary capacity. In either case, the question allowed the jury to decide the 
necessary facts for itself. See Duncan, 42 F.3d at 102-03 (in concluding that defendant 
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had filed "false tax returns" and engaged in "money laundering" expert "merely posited 
factual conclusions which are not prohibited even if 'they embrace an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the jury.'") (quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir.), 
cert, denied. 502 U.S. 813 (1991)). 
Dr. Dodd's opinion likewise would not have violated the prohibition against 
invading the trial judge's role to instruct the jury on the law. Torres, 758 F.2d at 150; 
Larsen. 865 P.2d at 1362. In determining whether an expert witness impermissibly 
comments of the relevant legal standard, courts inquire "whether the terms used by the 
witness have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that 
present in the vernacular." Torres, 758 F.2d at 151. When a term has "almost identical" 
popular and legal meanings, courts construe the term as a factual assessment rather than a 
legal conclusion. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362. 
Here, defense counsel did not ask Dr. Dodd to give a technical or specialized 
definition of reliability. Rather she asked him to evaluate the "process of identification" 
or, in other words, the facts and circumstances surrounding the identification. R. 317: 
216. This question plainly asked Dr. Dodd to discuss the "reliability" of the identification 
in the everyday, commonly understood sense of that word. Further, since the trial judge 
ruled on the legal reliability of the identification before trial, the question of reliability at 
trial was a factual issue for the jury to decide. 
Larsen, again, confirms this analysis. This Court reasoned that the expert did not 
29 
address the legal definition of materiality because that term not only addressed whether 
the defendant had violated securities laws but also whether the information that he 
omitted was factually "important or significant." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1362. Because the 
term "material" had "a popular meaning bearing directly on the factual issue before the 
jury," this Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the expert testimony. Id This 
Court ruled that any other interpretation would be "unduly formalistic." Id 
The federal courts have consistently construed even more charged phrases as 
factual. United States v. Sheffev. 57 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th Cir. 1995) (in second degree 
murder prosecution, several lay witnesses factually testified that defendant drove 
"recklessly" and with "extreme disregard for human life"); Heflin v. Stewart County. 958 
F.2d 709, 715 (6th Cir. 1992) (in civil rights suit, corrections expert properly testified that 
correctional officers acted "deliberately indifferent" to medical needs of prisoner when 
they failed to immediately cut down prisoner found hanging in prison cell); Torres, 758 
F.2d at 151 (although an expert could not testify that plaintiff had suffered 
"discrimination" based on national origin, expert could conclude that national origin 
"motivated" hiring decision). The term "reliability" is much more familiar to jurors than 
the terms at issue in those cases. Because the term reliability would not "require the jury 
to attempt to define for itself legal terms of art or to rely upon anything but their own life 
experience," the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow Dr. Dodd to give his 
opinion on the reliability of the identifications. Sheffey, 57 F.3d at 1426. 
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B. The Trial Judge Further Abused His 
Discretion in Excluding the Expert Testimony 
Given His Contempt for this Evidence and His 
Misunderstanding of the Law 
Given the trial judge's hostility toward expert identification evidence and his 
misperception of the law, he abused his discretion in excluding Dr. Dodd's opinion. The 
proper exercise of discretion requires judges to make informed, reasoned decisions based 
on the law. Here, the trial judge rejected the usefulness of expert testimony and rebuffed 
the law on eyewitness identification evidence. Because the trial judge substituted his own 
views for the facts and the law, he abused his discretion. 
In exercising their discretion, trial judges must make informed decisions based on 
the facts. "Failure to consider pertinent facts makes it impossible for the trial court to 
exercise a fully informed discretion." Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 646 (Utah 1980); 
see also West Valley Citv v. Patten, 1999 UT App 149, ^ f 12, 14, 981 P.2d420 (court's 
failure to consider alternatives to mistrial creates doubt about "'the propriety of the 
exercise of the trial judge's discretion'") (citation omitted). Contrary to this requirement, 
the trial judge disregarded the need to assist the jury on the reliability of the eyewitness 
identifications and, instead, concluded before the trial even began that Dr. Dodd's opinion 
was not admissible. Specifically, he belittled the research on eyewitness identification 
and he invited the prosecutor to raise "an appropriate motion" should Dr. Dodd venture 
beyond his suppression hearing testimony. R. 316: 9. Because the trial judge had already 
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concluded that Dr. Dodd's opinion was not admissible, he had no need to entertain 
arguments from counsel on the matter. By failing to consider the merits of admitting Dr. 
Dodd's opinion, the trial judge failed to "exercise a fully informed discretion." Kallas, 
614P.2dat646. 
The trial judge further abused his discretion by repudiating the well-established 
law and research on eyewitness identification. R. 316: 8. Although trial judges have 
discretion to admit expert testimony, "an abuse of discretion will be found when a trial 
court's decision to exclude an expert is induced by a misperception of the law." Walker v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 844 P.2d 335, 343 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Gawv. State. 798 P.2d 
1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Here, the trial judge questioned whether the research 
on eyewitness identifications was even "a field of study" and doubted whether this 
Court's opinion in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), "legitimizes this specific 
area of inquiry." R. 315: 87, 89. Then following Dr. Dodd's testimony at the suppression 
hearing, the trial judge ridiculed the research as stating the obvious and concluded that 
Dr. Dodd's expertise was "of little or no circumstance to me." R. 315: 106. He even 
ignored the results of Dr. Dodd's experiment and claimed that based on his "untrained eye 
perspective" the photo array was not suggestive. R. 315: 106. 
Similarly, at the beginning of the trial, the trial judge stated that he saw nothing 
"revolutionary" about this research because he "assumed before the Long case [that 
eyewitness identifications issues] were common knowledge." R. 316: 8-9. He then 
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refused to admit Dr. Dodd's opinion on reliability and summarily barred defense counsel 
from arguing the merits of admitting the evidence. Consistent with this attitude, at the 
hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial judge described the cautionary jury 
instruction that this Court endorsed in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as "that 
two or three page piece of work from Zimmerman." R. 318: 4. He then denied the 
motion and derisively stated that he was "not persuaded we need to have someone come 
down here and tell us that witnesses don't know what they see." R. 318: 
In contrast to the trial judge's views, this Court ruled in Long that "[t]here is no 
significant division of opinion on the issue. The studies all lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited and 
fallible." 721 P.2d at 488. This Court observed further that "the common knowledge that 
people do possess often runs contrary to documented research findings." Id. at 490. 
Despite accepted research on the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, this 
Court noted that "jurors are, for the most part, unaware of these problems. People simply 
do not accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the 
accuracy of the memory processes of an honest eyewitness." Id 
This Court recently reaffirmed the validity of the research on eyewitness 
identification in State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 984 P.2d 376. This Court held that 
"research has convincingly demonstrated the weaknesses inherent in eyewitness 
identification." Id. at f^ 27. Noting that "common knowledge . . . often runs contrary to 
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documented research findings," this Court concluded that "jurors do not appreciate the 
fallibility of such identifications [and] they often give eyewitness testimony undue 
weight" Id at ffl| 26, 27. 
Given the trial judge's plain misunderstanding of the validity of expert testimony 
on eyewitness identification and jurors' misunderstanding of it, he abused his discretion 
in excluding Dr. Dodd's opinion testimony. Walker, 844 P.2d at 343. 
C. The Refusal to Allow Expert Testimony on the 
Central Issue to the Case Harmed the Defense 
The trial judge's exclusion of Dr. Dodd's opinion testimony severely harmed the 
defense. To establish harm, there must be "a reasonable likelihood that in [the error's] 
absence there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. 
Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989). Although Dr. Dodd testified about the 
various factors affecting the identifications in this case, the trial judge's ruling prevented 
him from assisting the jury in weighing those factors. United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 
306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000) (expert testimony on eyewitness identification admissible to 
dispel jurors' misconceptions). Specifically, Dr. Dodd testified that the disguise, the 
witnesses' fear, the presence of guns, and repeated suggestion affected the witnesses' 
memories. Contrasting this testimony, the prosecutor emphasized that four witnesses 
identified Mr. Hollen. 
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Without allowing Dr. Dodd to offer an opinion on the significance of the various 
factors affecting eyewitness identifications, the jury was left to fend for itself about 
unfamiliar evidence. As this Court observed in Maestas, "[p]eople simply do not 
accurately understand the deleterious effects that certain variables can have on the 
accuracy of the memory process of an honest eyewitness." 1999 UT 32, }^ 27, 984 P.2d 
376 (emphasis added). The need for Dr. Dodd's testimony was no less significant here 
than the expert testimony on securities violations in Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). 
This Court ruled in that case that expert testimony was needed because "'the technical 
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average layman or subject within 
the common experience and would help the jury understand the issues before them.'" Id. 
at 1361 (quoting State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 492-93 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). The 
"variables" involved in eyewitness identifications are no more familiar to lay jurors. 
Maestas, 1999 UT 32, % 27, 984 P.2d 376. 
Moreover, the State failed to present any other evidence tying Mr. Hollen to the 
robberies. The trial judge and the prosecutor agreed that the prosecution rested entirely 
on the reliability of the eyewitness identifications. R. 316: 8; 317: 245. The State 
presented no other evidence connecting Mr. Hollen to the crime. The police recovered no 
physical evidence such as fingerprints, money, guns, swimming trunks, sandals or the 
disguise used in the robbery. In fact, the prosecution could not link Mr. Hollen to the one 
piece of evidence the police did recover: the foot imprint in Oscar's car. 
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Unlike Maestas. in this case, the State couldn't even present circumstantial 
evidence linking Mr. Hollen to the robberies. Rather, the identification testimony was the 
sole basis for the convictions. Given the lack of evidence, the exclusion of Dr. Dodd's 
opinion demands reversal. Id. 
II. THE FACTORS ADDRESSING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS 
DEMANDED SUPPRESSING THE IDENTIFICATION 
EVIDENCE 
The trial judge erred in denying Mr. Hollen's motion to suppress the eyewitness 
identifications because that evidence was constitutionally unreliable. Significant 
problems plagued each of the eyewitness identifications. Of most importance, the 
disguise prevented the witnesses from viewing the heavyset robber, the witnesses' fear 
and confusion and the presence of guns distracted them, and the witnesses were subjected 
to repeated suggestion. Because of the lack of evidence supporting the convictions, the 
admission of the eyewitness testimony harmed the defense. 
The admission of the witnesses' identifications violated Mr. Hollen's right to due 
process of law. The Utah Constitution bars the admission of unreliable eyewitness 
testimony. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780 (Utah 1991). Article I, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantees that, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." This provision requires trial judges to "determine 
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from the totality of the circumstances whether the admission of [eyewitness] 
identification is consistent" with due process guarantees. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781. Due 
process demands that trial courts must "determine, as a threshold matter, whether the 
identification is constitutionally reliable and thus, whether it can be properly admitted into 
evidence." State v. Hoffhine. 2001 UT 4, ^ 16, 413 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. 
In making these determinations, trial courts consider the following factors: 
"(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the 
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the 
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made spontaneously and remained 
consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed and 
the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and 
relate it correctly. This last area includes such factors as 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the 
observer during the time it was observed, and whether the race 
of the actor was the same as the observer's." 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 n.2 (Utah 1986)). 
In applying these principles, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper," preventing 
constitutionally unreliable eyewitness identification evidence from going to the jury. 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778; see also State v. Nelson. 950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). This gatekeeper role is premised on the empirical data establishing the fallibility 
of such evidence and the resulting potential for "erosion of constitutional guarantees." 
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778-80 (citing Long. 721 P.2d at 488-90 (discussing weaknesses of 
memory)). The State has the burden of establishing the reliability of eyewitness 
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identification testimony. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778; Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943. 
These factors demand suppression of each of the witnesses' identifications. First, 
although Oscar claimed that he had "plenty of opportunity" to view the assailant up close 
in good lighting conditions for 10 minutes, several circumstances interfered with his 
observations. Oscar noted that he mainly saw the assailants from the side. He also could 
not remember whether the disguised man wore a t-shirt or a tank top. Even more 
troubling, the disguise prevented all of the witnesses from viewing the actor's face. As 
Dr. Dodd explained "the concealment by disguise is particularly disruptive of the ability 
to remember the face, because we do in terms of actually remembering a face, we operate 
as a whole pattern rather than in individual pieces." R. 315: 98. 
The witnesses here had an extremely poor opportunity to view the disguised man. 
Because that man's head was covered, the witnesses could not determine the length or 
style of his hair. The wraparound sunglasses covered his eyes and the sides of his head. 
And, the fake mustache covered his upper lip and distorted his appearance. Although 
"any alteration" of the face diminishes witnesses' ability to identify a person, Dr. Dodd 
asserted that the disguise in this case had an "enormous influence" on the witnesses. R. 
317: 205, 217. As evidence that the disguise affected the witnesses' observations, Dr. 
Dodd noted that the witnesses could could not agree that Mr. Hollen was involved. 
Second, Oscar divided his attention between several concerns throughout the 
encounter. Obviously, two assailants brandishing guns demanded his attention rather just 
38 
one perpetrator. Oscar also admitted that he only looked at the disguised man's face "off 
and on" because he spent some time focusing on the guns. R. 315: 47. He also thought 
of his daughter and the others' safety during the robbery. Contrary to these distractions, 
time must be devoted to actually looking at a face to encode a memory. 
Third, fear impaired Oscar's observations. In describing the robbery, Oscar 
repeatedly emphasized his terror. In fact, Lou observed during the robbery that Oscar 
was visibly frightened. Oscar even stated that he was so "traumatized" after the robbery 
that he could not help the police and he had forgotten many details. R. 315: 49. 
Fourth, suggestion infected the entire proceedings. Initially, the composite appears 
to have affected all of the witnesses' memories. Although the witnesses agreed that the 
composite fairly represented the disguised man, they also conceded that it was not 
entirely accurate. 
With the image of the composite in his mind, Oscar viewed the photo array two 
months after the robbery. Regardless of what Det. Dalling informed Oscar before 
showing him the photo array, Oscar believed that the disguised man's picture was in the 
array. The United States Department of Justice guidelines on conducting photo arrays 
seek to avoid this very notion. National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement at 30 (1999) (hereinafter referred to 
as "Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence"). The Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence also 
recommend including, at least, five filler photos that resemble the defendant's picture. Id. 
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at 29. Dr. Dodd's experiment showed that the photo array contained only three pictures 
that matched the description of the disguised man. Given these circumstances plus crime 
victims5 desire to resolve crimes, it is not surprising that Oscar picked one of the pictures. 
Oscar's viewing of the pictures for two to three minutes before choosing one 
supports that he matched the pictures to fit his memory rather than him actually 
identifying the disguised man. This conclusion is consistent with research showing that 
memories fade within a "matter of days" of an event and that crime victims generally 
cannot identify their perpetrators who they have only seen one time. R. 317: 208-09, 220. 
These factors are particularly relevant when, as here, the disguise, the use of a gun, and 
fear reduced Oscar's, as well as the other witnesses', ability to initially encode the 
disguised man's face. 
Suggestion also tainted Oscar's subsequent identifications. After Oscar picked Mr. 
Hollen's picture, Det. Dalling informed Oscar that he had identified the correct person. 
Again, the Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence forbid such communications. Guidelines 
on Eyewitness Evidence at 33. Once Oscar saw Mr. Hollen's picture believing that he 
had accurately identified the disguised man, he predictably identified Mr. Hollen at the 
line-up as the one who "most" reflected the disguised man. R. 316: 69-70. Contrary to 
this case, the Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence encourage investigators to change the 
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line-up order each time a witness views a line-up.3 Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence at 
30. Finally, following the line-up, Oscar saw Mr. Hollen's picture at subsequent court 
proceedings and he learned that Mr. Hollen had been arrested for other robberies. 
Inconsistency also undermines Oscar's identification. At the preliminary hearing, 
he doubted whether Mr. Hollen had participated in the robbery. At trial, Oscar contended 
that his memory had improved since the preliminary hearing but research refutes his 
claims. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). Similarly, a witness's certainty of 
an identification has little or no correlation to accuracy. Id 
Similar problems plagued Charming's identification. The only opportunity for 
Charming to view the disguised man occurred outside the office while Lou conversed 
with the assailants and while they waited for Jill to bring the key. Charming could not see 
the men once they walked to the vault room because he walked in front of them and he 
faced the wall inside the vault room. 
Charming also appeared to have been distracted. When the assailants and Oscar 
approached him and Lou, Channing immediately focused on the disguised man's 
"unusual" mustache. He also thought the situation was a joke until the assailants flashed 
their guns. At that point, Channing had to expend energy to reassess his thinking. He 
also admitted to devoting some of his attention to the weapons. There was also two 
3Mr. Hollen was placed in the sixth position for all of the witnesses' viewings. 
Exhibit 27A. 
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assailants to observe. And, although Channing asserted that he remained calm and 
relaxed, Jill's testimony that she saw a tear in Channing's eye contradicts his claims. 
Factoring in these distractions together, Channing had a limited opportunity and capacity 
to view the disguised man. 
Suggestion is of particular concern with Channing's identification. According to 
Channing, the composite fairly represented the disguised man but it was limited to "what 
the computer could do." R. 315: 34-35. His viewing of the news report of Mr. Hollen's 
arrest for a similar crime was highly suggestive and violated the Guidelines on 
Eyewitness Evidence. Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence at 16. Then, the day after 
seeing Mr. Hollen on television, Channing viewed a photo array containing Mr. Hollen's 
picture. Given that the array contained only two other possible suspects, it is no wonder 
that Channing accused Mr. Hollen. Finally, the one to one-and-a-half minute that 
Channing viewed the photos indicates that he may not have remembered the assailant's 
face. 
Channing's subsequent, frequent exposure to Mr. Hollen cemented his initial, 
suggestion-influence identification. Like Oscar, Det. Dalling informed Channing 
following the photo array that he had accurately identified the person that the police had 
arrested. Then, by the time of the suppression hearing and trial, Channing had seen Mr. 
Hollen at the preliminary hearing, heard about other robberies, and had seen pictures of 
him at the co-defendant's trial and other court proceedings. 
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Several infirmities in Lou's testimony show that although Lou saw and spoke with 
the disguised man outside the office and inside the vault room, he did not accurately 
perceive him. Despite his claim that he remained in control of his emotions, he admitted 
that his perceptions were inhibited because he was "shocked" and confused when the 
assailants approached him. R. 315: 75. He also noted that the events transpired 
"quickly," thus indicating that he experienced stress. R. 315: 75. Lou also contradicted 
the other witnesses in informing the police that the disguised man, rather than the tall, 
slender man, wore the sweatshirt. 
Lou admitted that Channing had told him about seeing Mr. Hollen on the news 
report and he viewed the composite. Thus, entering the line-up, Lou knew of the 
likelihood that Mr. Hollen would be a participant. The Guidelines on Eyewitness 
Evidence discourage this very kind of communication between witnesses. Guidelines on 
Eyewitness Evidence at 15. 
In the face of this suggestion and despite perhaps having the best opportunity to 
see the disguised man, Lou lacked confidence in his line-up identification and he declined 
to mark his choice in the box provided. Instead, he marked his choice below the box and 
stated that he was "pretty sure, but not definite." Exhibit 27A. Lou even admitted that he 
identified Mr. Hollen because he was the "closest choice." R. 315: 82. This admission is 
consistent with research showing that victims' desire to identify their assailant will cause 
them to identify the person who most resembles the perpetrator in a line-up. 
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Like Oscar and Charming, Lou was exposed to additional information that 
irreparably tainted his identification. After the line-up Lou encountered several witnesses 
of other robberies. Lou overheard these witnesses mention that the police had accused 
Mr. Hollen of committing robberies at a movie theater and the Million Dollar Saloon. 
As for Jill, her only opportunity to view the disguised man occurred in the vault 
room while she emptied the safe. Specifically, when she exited the office, she only 
glanced at the assailants a few seconds. Then, on the way to the vault room, she walked 
behind the men and could not see them. 
Once inside the vault room, Jill glanced at the disguised man three times. 
Although she estimated that she saw the man 30 seconds each time, she appears to have 
overestimated the time length because she said that the event happened "quickly" and the 
disguised man ordered her to look away each time. As Dr. Dodd pointed out, witnesses 
tend to exaggerate time by a factor of two to ten when under stress. 
Like the other witnesses, Jill was distracted when she saw the disguised man in the 
vault room. She had to process why Lou had told her to open the door for several 
unauthorized persons. Her confiision mounted when the robbers informed her to open the 
safe and Lou confirmed that she should comply. Then, contrary to the assailants' claim 
that they were conducting a drill, Jill became increasingly concerned when she realized 
that the assailants were binding the others and she saw Channing with a tear in his eyes. 
Jill also admitted that she divided her attention between emptying the safe, 
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glancing at the assailants, and watching the robbers tie up her co-workers. For example, 
she focused her attention on Channing sufficiently long to noticed a tear in his eye. She 
noted that because the events "happened quickly" she could not recall all the details. R. 
315: 62-63. As an indication of her limited ability to perecive, Jill could not remember 
immediately after the robbery if the disguised man wore sunglasses and she could not 
remember whether he wore a tank top, t-shirt, or both. She also admitted that she has 
tried suppress her memory of the crime. 
Like the other witnesses, suggestion tainted Jill's identification. First, Jill saw the 
composite. Then, contrary to the Guidelines on Eyewitness Evidence, she heard before 
attending the line-up that the police had arrested someone for the robbery and that the 
suspects were accused of robbing the Million Dollar Saloon. Guidelines on Eyewitness 
Evidence at 30. Apparently relying on this information, Jill conceded at trial that she 
assumed that the suspects would be participants in the line-up. She admitted further that 
she had described the disguised man as overweight and that Mr. Hollen was one of the 
most, if not the most, overweight persons in the line-up. 
Weighing these factors leads to one conclusion: the witnesses' identifications were 
unreliable. The witnesses were distracted and confused, the disguise prevented them 
from seeing his face and it altered their perceptions, they could not agree on the disguised 
man's shirt, the presence of guns distracted them further, and they suffered fear and stress 
in varying degrees. Most importantly, the witnesses were exposed to suggestion at every 
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stage of the proceedings. 
Although four witnesses either positively or tentatively identified Mr. Hollen as 
the disguised man, the power of suggestion readily accounts for the identifications. Even 
excluding suggestion, the witness were less than unanimous in their identifications. Two 
witnesses, David Peterson and Janae Jones, could not identify Mr. Hollen and Lou could 
only say that Mr. Hollen was a "possible]" suspect. R. 315: 82. 
This Court found that similar problems required reversal in State v. Maestas, 1999 
UT 32, 984 P.2d 376. In that case, a man wearing a mask and a baseball cap while 
brandishing a gun robbed a convenience store and a restaurant within an hour. Id. at ^ 2. 
The victim in the convenience store robbery saw the assailant for two minutes, he claimed 
not to be scared, and he concentrated on the man's facial features. Id at ^ | 2-3. He 
identified the defendant as the robber in a suggestive show-up after overhearing a police 
radio report that the police had caught a suspect in the second robbery. Id. at^ f 4. 
There were six victims in the restaurant robbery who saw the robber for as little as 
a few seconds and as much as four minutes. Id at ^ 7-11. The victims experienced fear 
and could not agree on the assailant's clothing, eye color, the presence of wrinkles, or 
whether the assailant had an accent or walked with a gait. Id at ^ 5-11. Two of the 
victims attended the same show-up as the victim in the convenience store robbery. Id at 
Tf 8. These two identified the defendant after discussing their observations with each 
other and agreeing together that the defendant was the assailant. Id at ^ 8. At a line-up, 
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the same three witnesses who attended the show-up identified the defendant as the robber, 
two witnesses identified the defendant as a possibility, and two chose other subjects. Id. 
at Tf 12. Although the defendant drove a car similar to the robber's, had some cash on 
him, and possessed similar clothing as the assailant's, the police found no physical 
evidence linking the defendant to the robberies. Id. at f^ 14-16. 
This Court concluded that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to 
request a Long instruction on eyewitness identification. Id at |^ 32. This Court noted the 
"highly suggestive show-up," the discrepancies in the witnesses' observations, the 
witnesses' fear, the use of a gun, and the robber's disguise. Id at f^ 23-25, 29. Even more 
persuasive, this Court noted that only three of seven witnesses could identify the 
defendant at the line-up. Id at f^ 24. This Court also found significant the "limited 
opportunity to observe the robber," the short length of the crimes, and cross-racial factors. 
Id at Tf 29. 
Although there are differences between this case and Maestas, numerous 
similarities are evident. The robbers in both cases employed disguises that covered their 
faces, a gun was used in both, the witnesses could not agree on the assailant's clothing, 
the witnesses expressed fear and stress, and there was limited opportunity to view the 
assailant. In this case, suggestion not only affected the photo array but also the line-up. 
And, like Maestas, some witnesses were not sure of their identifications and others could 
not identify the defendant. Finally, the police in both cases could not connect the 
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defendant to any physical evidence. 
Although the appellant in Maestas brought an ineffective counsel claim, this 
Court's conclusion applies with equal force to the reliability of the identifications in this 
matter. The trial judge's erroneous determination concerning the reliability of the 
identifications requires reversal. When trial court action deprives a defendant of a 
constitutional right, this Court must reverse a conviction unless the error was "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, If 30, 973 P.2d 404. The only 
evidence linking Mr. Hollen to the robbery was the witness identifications. The State 
produced no other evidence, circumstantial or direct, to connect Mr. Hollen to the crimes. 
Absent the identification testimony, the State cannot support the convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge prejudiced the defense in refusing to allow admissible 
expert testimony and in admitting unreliable eyewitness testimony, reversal and a remand 
for a new trial are required. 
SUBMITTED this ^ 3 ^ a y of April, 2001. 
KENT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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• The motion of. . to enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly in • granted • denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted byjD .ajury; • the court, • plea of guilty; 
• plea, of_no contest; of the offense of A ^ ^ f t ^ ™ ^ r ^ O D C L T ^ , a felony 
of the ^ degree, • a class misdeme&b\*X being now present in courted ready for sentence and 
represented by K . <E^fryf\ , and the State being represented byfej 
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to a maximum mandatory term of 
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of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
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and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
years and which may be life; 





such sentence is to run concurrently with 
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upon motion of • State, • Defense, • Court, Court(s) . are hereby dismiss' 
Defendant is granted a stay of above ( Q prison ) sentence and placed on probation in the custody of 
this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the 
period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyJS$ for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, or • for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be 
confined and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Commitment shall issue ^ ^ v T ^ w C N , 
sasrvjttv 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: W* 
Defense Counsel 
( 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
Based upon the plea of the defendant, the defendant's admissions in open court, and the charge contained in the 
Information, the Court finds that the defendant used a firearm or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm in 
the commission or furtherance of the offense of which the defendant has been adjudged guilty; 
Judge's 
Inl #r/ and it is ordered that tfWlefendant be confined and imprisoned at the Utah State Prison for a 
term Dof one year, or ly not to exceed five years, as provided by law for the use of a firearm or 
facsimile or the representation of a firearm in the commission or furtherance of the offense of 
which the defendant has been adjudged guilty. Such sentence shall run consecutively and 
not concurrently with the basic sentence set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon finding that the defendant is in the status of a habitual criminal, the defendanat is sen-
tenced to: 
a not less than five years and which may/)]B /)br life at the Utah State Priss 
DATED this day of .19. 
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